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Monkeypox — Enhancing public health preparedness for an
emerging lethal human zoonotic epidemic threat in the wake of
the smallpox post-eradication era
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
The identification of monkeypox in 3 separate patients in the United Kingdom in September raised media
and political attention on an emerging public health threat. Nigeria, whose last confirmed case of
monkeypox was in 1978, is currently experiencing an unusually large and outbreak of human monkeypox
cases, a ‘One Human-Environmental-Animal Health’ approach is being effectively used to define and
tackle the outbreak. As of 13th October 2018, there have been one hundred and sixteen confirmed cases
the majority of whom are under 40 years. Over the past 20 years ten Central and West African countries
have reported monkeypox cases which have risen exponentially. We review the history and evolution of
monkeypox outbreaks in Africa and USA, the changing clinical presentations, and discuss possible factors
underlying the increasing numbers being detected including the cessation of smallpox vaccination
programs. Major knowledge gaps remain on the epidemiology, host reservoir, and emergence,
transmission, pathogenesis and prevention of monkeypoz.
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The repeated outbreaks of zoonotic infectious diseases with
epidemic potential in Central and West Africa, such as Ebola, Rift
valley fever, Chikungunya and Dengue, continue to pose major
public health threats to regional, continental and global health
security (WHO, 2018a,b). Whilst lessons are being learnt from each
outbreak (Zumla et al., 2017), and the ‘One Human-Environmental-
Animal Health’ approach is gaining momentum (Eteng et al., 2018),
much more remains to be done to achieve a substantial change of
the status quo (Zumla et al., 2016). Critical to achieving this will be
to effectively take forward and consolidate new African-led
initiatives (Nkengasong et al., 2017; Nkengasong and Onyebujoh,
2018) that will reinforce integration of contextual knowledge of
drivers and risks, and better enable Africa’s preparedness to tackle
and prevent emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases threats.
Monkeypox in the United Kingdom
Monkeypox has recently focused global media, political and
scientific attention after the identification in the United Kingdom
(UK) in September 2018 of 3 separate patients diagnosed with
monkeypox (PHE, 2018). The first 2 had a recent travel history to
Nigeria where there is an ongoing outbreak of the disease (Vaughan
et al., 2018). Both cases were symptomatic during their return flight
to the UK. A third case of monkeypox in the United Kingdomhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2018.11.008
1201-9712/© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).occurred in a healthcare worker who cared for one of the two first
cases. The healthcare worker was infected well before monkeypox
was suspected and special infection control precautions were put in
place. Secondary and tertiary human-to-human transmission of
monkeypox has been well documented (Jezek et al., 1986; Nolen
et al., 2016; Kalthan et al., 2018). Since these three cases of human
monkeypox were the first ever reported from the European Union
(EU) and the disease has similar clinical features with smallpox
which had a devastating impact globally, media hype and enhanced
political, and scientific attention ensued. Whilst the clinical
manifestations of monkeypox are milder than smallpox, the disease
can be fatal with case fatality rate between 1% and 10% being
reported (Jezek et al., 1988a,b; Hutin et al., 2001; Di Giulio and
Eckburg, 2004; Jezek et al., 1987a,b).
Monkeypox in Central and West Africa
Nigeria, whose last confirmed case of monkeypox was in 1978
(Gromyko and Daramola, 1979), is currently experiencing an
unusually large and lethal outbreak (WHO, 2017; CDC, 2017;
Yinka-Ogunleye et al., 2018). On September 22, 2017, the Nigeria
Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) commenced an outbreak
investigation following the identification of an 11-year old child
with suspected monkeypox (Eteng et al., 2018). Epidemic
preparedness requires close collaboration between human and
animal health sectors to define the outbreak and effectivelyciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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CDC was prepared, activating a multiagency interdisciplinary
emergency operations center (EOC) on October 9th, 2017, which
took forward a well implemented comprehensive incident action
plan (NCDC, 2018). This included targeted epidemiological and
research investigations at high-risk areas at the Human-Environ-
mental-Animal interface, enhanced laboratory diagnostic and
rapid sequencing capacities, assessment of risk factors and modes
of transmission. (Yinka-Ogunleye et al., 2018; Faye et al., 2018).
Available data suggest that human cases are not epidemiologically
linked in the current outbreak, and that it is either a multisource
outbreak with limited human to human transmission or an
outbreak that has arisen from increased human contact with
previously undetected endemically infected humans (Nigeria CDC,
2018; Durski et al., 2018a; Faye et al., 2018). The exact zoonotic
origin and the specific role(s) of environmental and ecological
factors in the Nigeria outbreak are not yet known.
New cases of monkeypox continue to be detected in Nigeria. As of
13th October 2018, there have been one hundred and sixteen
confirmed cases (with 8 deaths = 6% mortality), and 280 additional
suspected cases from across 16 Nigerian States (Nigeria CDC, 2018)
affecting children and adults of all ages (Figure 1). The majority of
confirmed monkeypox cases are under 40 years with a median age of
31 years. Notably, these people were born after global vaccination
programs for smallpox were discontinued in 1978. Studies in
monkeys have shown that immunization with smallpox vaccine
induces cross-protection against monkeypox (McConnell et al.,
1968). The question arises – did the mass smallpox vaccination
program help prevent the spread of human monkeypox? There have
been several suggestions (Durski et al., 2018a; Rimoin et al., 2010;
Reynolds and Damon, 2012) that increasing number of monkeypox
cases in Central and West Africa is probably a consequence of the
cessation of smallpox vaccination in the early 1980s, following the
eradicationofsmallpox.Theapparent lackofcross-protectionagainst
monkeypox among the non-vaccinated younger age groups and the
waning smallpox vaccine-induced population immunity in theFigure 1. (Source: ‘Situation Report- vaccinated groups, may contribute to the increased susceptibility to
monkeypox infection. This creates an ecological niché where the
monkey pox virus can expand in humansoutside its natural reservoir.
Of note is that the number of human monkeypox cases being
reported have risen exponentially over the past 20 years, more
than the total number of cases over the previous 45 years since its
first discovery (WHO, 2018a,b; Sklenovska and van Ranst, 2018;
Durski et al., 2018a; Yinka-Ogunleye et al., 2018; Rimoin et al.,
2010). To date human cases of monkeypox have been reported
from ten African countries – Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gabon and South Sudan
(WHO, 2018a,b). Whilst the cessation of smallpox vaccination
might be an important risk factor, there may be other factors which
could explain the increase (Nolen et al., 2015; Sklenovská and Van
Ranst, 2017) such as: (a) higher frequency of contact with animal
host reservoirs by children and young adults, (b) deforestation
leading to increased exposure of humans with displaced animals,
(c) Wars, conflicts and poverty leading to population movement
into forests, (d) reliance on rodents for food, (e) increased
population density, and (f) Improved surveillance and diagnostic
capability, although the latter was probably not the case due to
reduced resources. Further multidisciplinary, regional collabora-
tive research, including carefully designed case-control and cohort
studies are required to fill the major knowledge gaps in the
epidemiology, host reservoir, transmission, pathogenesis surveil-
lance and prevention, as well as to explore potential prevention,
infection control and treatment interventions.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) (WHO, 2018a,b) currently
considers monkeypox to be “a rare viral zoonotic disease that occurs
primarily in remote parts of central and Africa, near tropical
rainforests”. This WHO statement may no longer be valid, and requires
further discussion, review of evidence and debate. There is thus an
urgent need for the conduct of priority research and surveillance
through a combined ‘ONE-Human-Environmental-Animal-Health’
effort across Central and West Africa to increase the evidence baseNigeria CDC. www.ncdc.gov.ng).
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spread of monkeypox across a wide geographic area of Central and
West Africa, and the real potential for further spread regionally and
internationally is of major concern and requires coordinated review
(Durski et al., 2018a; Sklenovska and van Ranst, 2018). The ecological,
zoonotic, epidemiological, clinical and public health aspects of
monkeypox remain inadequately characterized (WHO, 2018a,b;
Heymann et al., 1998; Sklenovska and van Ranst, 2018; Rimoin
et al., 2007, 2010; Hoff et al., 2017; Learned et al., 2005; Durski et al.,
2018a;Yinka-Ogunleyeetal.,2018).Datafromreportsandcasestudies
of sporadic outbreaks in West and Central Africa over the past 50 years
provide basic understanding, although the available literature is
limited in its scope and the outbreak reports are incomparable. It is an
opportune time to reflect on the discovery and historical evolution of
monkeypox in Central and West Africa and view this in light of the
current global attention on emerging infections.
First discovery and animal host reservoir
The monkeypox virus was first discovered in 60 years ago (von
Magnus et al., 1959) and continues to remain on the radar of WHO
since then (Heymann et al., 1998; Breman et al., 1980; WHO, 1984;
WHO, 2018a,b). This zoonotic infection remains endemic to Central
and West Africa in animal(s) reservoir(s), with increasing numbers of
humancasesandoutbreaksbeingreported(SklenovskaandvanRanst,
2018; , 2007; , 2010; Hoff et al., 2017; Learned et al., 2005; Durski et al.,
2018a; Yinka-Ogunleye et al., 2018). Monkeypox is caused by a double
stranded DNA virus which belongs to the Orthopoxvirus genus of the
family Poxviridae family (WHO, 2018a,b; CDC, 2018; Shchelkunov
et al., 2001). The monkeypox virus was first detected in the 1958 in
an outbreak of a vesicular diseases in captive monkeys brought to
Copenhagen, Denmark from Africa for research purposes, hence the
name monkeypox (von Magnus et al.,1959). The term ‘monkeypox’
may be inappropriate since the virus has been found in rodents and
squirrels and the specific host reservoir has not yet been identified
(Doty et al., 2017). The extent of the host animal reservoir, the
natural history and pathogenesis of monkeypox in both animal and
humans remains unknown and requires definition through case-
control studies. In August 1970 the first human case of monkeypox
was identified in a 9-year-old child with smallpox-like vesicular
skin lesions in the villageof Bukenda in the Equatorial regionof Zaire
(now Democratic Republic of Congo – DRC) (Marennikova et al.,
1972). This patient was found during a period of intensified
surveillance for smallpox cases, 9 months after the elimination of
smallpox in DRC was certified by WHO. Retrospective studies
indicated that similar cases had occurred between 1970-1971 in the
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone (Fine et al., 1988;
Heymann et al.,1998; Breman et al.,1980; WHO,1980). Subsequent
increased surveillance led to a steady increase in the number of
human monkeypox cases being identified, and each human case
was investigated using standardized case investigation forms. Cases
continued to be detected as isolated cases, in small clusters, or
during large outbreaks in the community and in households (Nolen
et al., 2016). An exponential rise in the number of cases were
reported from the DRC (Learned et al., 2005; Reynolds et al., 2013;
Nolen et al., 2016) and from across Central and West Africa has
occurred over the past two decades (WHO, 2018a,b; Khodakevich
et al., 1985; Sklenovska and van Ranst, 2018; Rimoin et al., 2007,
2010; Learned et al., 2005; Kantele et al., 2016; Hoff et al., 2017;
Durski et al., 2018a; Yinka-Ogunleye et al., 2018).
Monkeypox prevalence, changing clinical presentations and
smallpox vaccination
In 1980, the Global Commission for the Certification of
Smallpox Eradication (GCCSE) continued to designate monkeypoxas an important public health threat and recommended that the
epidemiological, ecological and surveillance program on mon-
keypox be continued (WHO, 1980). In response, the WHO
supported an active surveillance program for human monkeypox
from 1981 to 1986. Other countries of Central and West Africa
continued to report cases of monkeypox in humans and in wildlife
(Doty et al., 2017; Hutin et al., 2001). At the end of the smallpox
eradication campaign, the GCCSE stated that continued smallpox
vaccination to prevent monkeypox was not justified based on the
evidence available at that time.
The clinical presentation of monkeypox includes symptoms
with skin and mucosal lesions which are difficult to distinguish
from smallpox (Jezek et al., 1987a,b; Jezek et al., 1988a,b; Hutin
et al., 2001; Di Giulio and Eckburg., 2004). As with smallpox, the
prodromal period of monkeypox infection starts with fever,
headache, back pain, myalgia and asthenia followed by eruption
of skin and mucosal lesions starting with the face (within 1–3 days
after development of fever). The lesions evolve from maculo-
papular to fluid filled vesicles to pustules followed by crusting
within 10 days and complete disappearance of the crusts within 3
weeks (Nigeria CDC, 2018; Osadebe et al., 2017). Whilst immuno-
suppression may be a risk factor for severe disease, the effects of
HIV co-infection remain to be determined. Lymphadenopathy is
common and may be a clinical distinguishing feature from
smallpox. Laboratory tests available for confirming a diagnosis
of monkeypox include Polymerase chain reaction (PCR), antigen
detection tests, Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and
viral cell culture (PHE, 2018; CDC, 2018)
Based on clinical and epidemiological features,and linking
genotypic studies of monkeypox virus isolates two distinct clades
of virus have been characterized (Likos et al., 2005; Nakazawa
et al., 2015): Congo Basin (CB) and West African (WA). The CB clade
is associated with higher (approximately 10%) mortality and seems
to transmit more frequently between humans with several human-
to human transmission cycles. The WA clade causes milder disease
with lower mortality rates (Breman et al., 1980).
There are differences in skin and mucosal lesions in patients with
previous smallpox vaccination as defined by presence of vaccination
scar, compared to those patients who were not vaccinated (Jezek
et al.,1987a,b;Huhn et al., 2005; Damon, 2011; DiGiulio andEckburg,
2004; McCollum and Damon, 2014). In vaccinated individuals the
skin rashes and vesicles appear less intense, milder and more
pleomorphic, and fewer in comparison with those unvaccinated
individuals. Smallpox vaccination appeared to provide 85% protec-
tion against monkeypox infection (Fine et al., 1988). The average
annual primary attack rate was estimated at 1.7 per 10,000 in those
unvaccinated, compared to a rate of 0.04 per 10,000 among those
who were vaccinated (Rimoin et al., 2010). Whilst new vaccines are
being developed for monkeypox, there is a need to conduct o
controlled clinical trials to evaluate the efficacy and impact of
smallpox vaccines for prevention of monkeypox or modification of
disease severity. Studies should focus on the cost benefit of
population level vaccination and investigation of alternative
vaccination strategies such as targeting vaccination to affected
areas, contacts and healthcare workers, and wider geographical
areas. Currently, the CDC recommends pre-exposure smallpox
vaccination for field investigators, veterinarians, animal-control
personnel, contacts of monkeypox patients, researchers and health-
care workers caring for patients and their contacts (CDC 2018).
Several reviews have summarised human monkeypox
outbreaks over the past 38 years (Rimoin et al., 2010; Sklenovská
and Van Ranst, 2018; Durski et al., 2017; Durski et al., 2018b).
Population-based surveillance studies conducted in nine health
zones in DRC identified 760 laboratory-confirmed human
monkeypox cases with an annual cumulative incidence of 5.53
per 10,000 (2.18–14.42) (Rimoin et al., 2010). Factors associated
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male gender, age less than 15years, and absence of prior smallpox
vaccination. A 5.2-fold lower risk of monkeypox was seen in those
who had received smallpox vaccination than unvaccinated persons
(0.78 vs. 4.05 per 10,000). A 20-fold increase in human monkeypox
incidence was observed compared to surveillance data from the
same region from the 1980s. Between January 2001 and December
2004, the DRC Ministry of Health surveillance program (Rimoin
et al., 2007) reported that 2,734 cases of suspected human
monkeypox from 11 provinces which showed annual upward
trends: 380 cases in 2001, 545 in 2002, 783 in 2003, and 1026 in
2004. The majority of cases (94%) occurred in children and young
adults less than 25 years of age who had not received smallpox
vaccination. Surveillance activities after 2005 were then inter-
rupted by the civil war over 20 years. In the conflict zone of the
Kivu region refugee displacements into forested areas increased in
2012 when the war accelerated. Monkeypox cases continue to be
reported from the DRC (Hoff et al., 2017) including areas of conflict
(McCollum et al., 2015), with human to human transmission
occurring during outbreaks (Nolen et al., 2016).
Animal exports and outbreaks in the USA
Monkeypox remained an ignored global public health threat
and only became the center of global attention when the first
human monkeypox cases outside Africa were detected in the
United States of America in 2003 (CDC, 2003a,b,c). Several people
in the mid-west United States developed fever, rash, respiratory
symptoms, and lymphadenopathy and outbreak investigations
linked the monkeypox cases following exposure to pet prairie dogs
(Cynomys species) (CDC, 2003a). Cases of monkeypox were
reported from six states—Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Ohio,
and Wisconsin – during the 2003 U.S. outbreak (CDC, 2003b).
Molecular and epidemiological investigations found that a west
African genetic group (clade) of monkeypox was imported from
Ghana into the state of Texas, USA on April 9, 2003, through a
shipment of nine different species of small mammals, including six
genera of African rodents (CDC, 2003c). Evidence of monkeypox
virus was cultured from 22 animals and monkeypox DNA was
found in at least 33 (Hutson et al., 2007). These included rope
squirrels (Funiscuirus sp.), tree squirrels (Heliosciurus sp.), brush-
tailed porcupines (Atherurus sp.), African giant pouched rats
(Cricetomys sp.), dormice (Graphiurus sp.), and striped mice
(Lemniscomys sp.). Some of the infected animals were housed
near North American prairie dogs (Cynomys sp) which were sold as
pets. The prairie dogs harbored large amounts of monkeypox virus
which was detected in lesions in the, tongue, skin, lung, and eyelid
samples (Hutson et al., 2007). Genomic studies of monkeypox
viruses isolated from a human, a prairie dog, a rope squirrel, a
dormouse, and a giant pouched rat showed identical viral isolates.
Animal reservoirs
Indirect or direct contact with live or dead animals is assumed
to be the driver of human monkeypox infections in humans (Durski
et al., 2018a; Sklenovská and Van Ranst, 2018). Monkeypox
primarily occurs in animals in the equatorial rain forests in West
Africa and Central Africa (WHO, 2018a,b; CDC, 2018; Nigeria CDC,
2018; Khodakevich et al., 1986; Hutin et al., 2001). In 1985, the
virus was isolated from a moribund rope squirrel (Funisciurus
anerythrus) in Zaire (DRC) during an outbreak investigation
(Khodakevich et al., 1986). Evidence of monkeypox infection has
been found in a range of animal species: squirrels (rope and tree),
rats, striped mice, dormice and monkeys (Khodakevich et al., 1986;
Reynolds et al., 2010; Radonic et al., 2012; Radonic et al., 2014; Doty
et al., 2017). The specific animal host reservoir of monkeypox, thenatural history of animal and human monkeypox infections
remains unknown. Further studies are needed to understand the
extent of animal host reservoir, how the virus maintained in
nature, the natural history, the pathogen-host associations and the
effect of climatic and ecological factors which affect shifts of
monkeypox between geographical areas and to causing disease in
humans (Thomassen et al., 2013).
Modes of transmission
The exact mode of transmission of the monkeypox virus to
humans remains unknown. Primary animal to human infection is
assumed to occur through direct or indirect contact with
monkeypox infected animal bodily fluids through handling, bites
or scratches, although the specific mechanism(s) remains to be
defined. The virus is thought to enter the body through broken
skin, the respiratory tract, or the mucous membranes (eyes, nose,
or mouth). Secondary human-to-human, transmission is well
documented (Jezek et al., 1988a,b, 1986; Hutin et al., 2001) and is
thought to occur through large respiratory droplets or direct or
indirect contact with body fluids, lesion material, and contami-
nated surfaces or other material such as clothing or linens.
Prolonged contact places hospital staff and family members at
greater risk of infection. Nosocomial transmission has been
recorded (Learned et al., 2005). There is no evidence, to date,
that person-to-person transmission alone can sustain monkeypox
infections in the human population.
There have been few genomic studies on the origins of
monkeypox outbreaks. Human-to-human transmission has been
reported from primary human cases, secondary cases (Arita et al.,
1985; Jezek et al., 1986) and serial transmission across four cases
has been observed (Nolen et al., 2016). In the current monkeypox
outbreak in Nigeria, genomic studies on monkeypox virus isolates
from human cases (Faye et al., 2018) suggest that the index case
was not imported into Nigeria. Current evidence suggests that the
outbreak is caused by multiple source emergence into the human
population, and not sustained by human to human transmission.
The zoonotic source(s) of the outbreak are currently under
investigation, and it is unclear what, if any, environmental or
ecologic changes might have facilitated its sudden reemergence in
Nigeria. Clustering of cases has been identified within states,
although no epidemiological linkages across states have yet been
identified. Three family clusters have been identified and this
suggests human-to-human transmission (Nigeria CDC, 2018; Faye
et al., 2018). In one family the secondary attack rate was 71%.
However, since most cases have no obvious epidemiologic linkage
suggestive of person-to-person contact, the hypothesis of a
multiple-source outbreak is reinforced, but this does not exclude
emergence from contact with humans that are a part of previously
unrecognized human endemic disease.
Addressing gaps in knowledge and strengthening public health
preparedness
Most of the currently available data on monkeypox comes from
individual case or outbreak reports, and from passive intermittent
surveillance, all of which do not portray an accurate overall picture.
The rapid response by the Nigerian CDC (Nigeria CDC, 2018) to the
ongoing monkeypox outbreak is example of how a locally led
integrated Human-Animal Disease Surveillance and Response
system can be used effectively to define the outbreak, and points
the way forward for other African countries. Nigeria’s experience is
important for regional training and help build networks to improve
surveillance capacity, laboratory diagnostics, best public health and
clinical practice, and regional capacities to launch locally led efficient
responses. This would contribute to the need to build public health
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surveillance, data collection, prevention, preparedness and response
activities to monkeypox and other emerging and re-emerging
infections with epidemic potential. Advancing public health pre-
paredness and aligning proactive surveillance activities to priority
research will require a coordinated, locally-led, multidisciplinary
efforts aligned closely with capacity development and training.
Conclusions
An approximately 20-fold increase in monkeypox incidence
compared to the historic data upto 1986 has occurred in and West
Africa (WHO, 2018a,b; Sklenovska and van Ranst, 2018; Durski et al.,
2018a; Yinka-Ogunleye et al., 2018; Rimoin et al., 2010). Novel lethal
zoonotic pathogens of humans with epidemic potential and high
mortality rates have threatened global health security for centuries
and continue to do so (Zumla et al., 2017). The ecological gap of the
increasing number of humans with no immunity to poxvirus after
the end of thesmallpox vaccinationprogramresultedina susceptible
population where secondary epidemiological cycles can occur.
Whilst there is no evidence to date, that person-to-person
transmission alone can sustain these zoonotic infections in the
humans, the continuing outbreaks caused by lethal zoonotic
pathogens such asEbola Virus, theMiddle EastrespiratorySyndrome
coronavirus and monkeypox virus highlights the interconnected-
ness between Humans, Animals and the Environment. This
emphasizes that a ‘One-Human-Environmental-Animal Health’
approach is required to reduce the risk of outbreaks and this
challenge warrants priority political and funder attention (Zumla
et al., 2016). Whilst the ‘One Human-Environmental-Animal Health’
approach is gaining traction, much more remains to be done to
achieve a substantial change to the status quo (Zumla et al., 2017).
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